University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 Winter 1983

Article 13

1983

Book Reviews: Regulation by Prosecution: The
Securities and Exchange Commission vs.
Corporate America; The Transformation of Wall
Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Modern Corporate Finance
Mark A. Sargent
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sargent, Mark A. (1983) "Book Reviews: Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Corporate
America; The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance,"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol12/iss2/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
REGULATION

BY PROSECUTION:

THE

SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE

By Roberta S. Karmel.t Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, 1982. Pp. 400; THE TRANSCOMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA.

A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE. By Joel
FORMATION OF WALL STREET:

Seligman.tt Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass., 1982. Pp.
701. Reviewed by Mark A. Sargent.ttt
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) today resembles
a bureaucratic version of St. Sebastian, pierced with arrows flung from
every direction. The Burger court, for example, has persistently refused
to follow the SEC's suggestions on a broad variety of questions ranging
from the definition of "security,"' to the establishment of a scienter
standard in rule lOb-5 enforcement actions,2 to the preemption of state
takeover regulation.3 Homer Kripke, a former SEC staff member and
well-known scholar and lawyer, has argued forcefully that the economic and psychological premises of the SEC's system of corporate disclosure are nonsense.4 The members of Stanley Sporkin's once-proud
SEC Enforcement Division were scattered to the winds during the last
days of the Carter administration and the early days of the present regime,5 and Sporkin himself has moved on to become General Counsel
of the Central Intelligence Agency, thus abandoning the world of full
disclosure for the world of nondisclosure. Most ominous, however, is
the rapidly gathering revolution in financial institutions. This revolution will obliterate the traditional boundaries between the various sectors of the financial world, and may also obliterate the SEC's
traditional niche in that world.6
t
tt
ttt
1.
2.
3.

4.

Partner, Rogers & Wells, New York City.
Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law.
B.A., Wesleyan University, 1973; M.A., Cornell University, 1975; J.D., Cornell
Law School, 1978; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of
Law.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2620 (1982). The SEC, arguing as amicus curiae,
urged the Court to hold that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was preempted
by the Williams Act. The Court ultimately found the Illinois statute unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds, but Justice White, who wrote the majority
opinion, was unable to command a majority on the preemption question. The
SEC was also unable to convince the Court to find preemption of the Idaho Takeover Statute in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). In that
case the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's finding of preemption on procedural
grounds.
H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
OF A PURPOSE

(1979).

5. See Bruck, Waning Daysfor the Zealot of the SEC THE AM. LAW. 14 (Oct. 1980);
Washington Lawyer John FeddersPicked as Head of SEC's Enforcement Division,
Wall St. J., June 29, 1981, at 10, col. 2.
6. For recent surveys of these developments, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECUR-
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Roberta S. Karmel has joined in the barrage. The arrows hurled
in her portentously-titled book, Regulation by Prosecution.- The Securities andExchange Commission vs. CorporateAmerica,7 may also carry a
special sting, because she was a true SEC "insider." Not only did she
work as a member of the SEC staff from 1962-68, 8 but she also served
as a commissioner from September 20, 1977 to February 1, 1980.' In
addition, she is not an ideological conservative, but rather a self-proclaimed "liberal,"'" with no delusions about the need to restore the
"free" market. Her criticisms, therefore, will sting because they come
from one of the SEC's own, not from one of its traditional enemies in
the business world. They will also smart because Karmel is exceptionally well-informed, as exemplified by her mastery of terminology and
concepts such as "hard-clobbers,"' "disintermediation,"1 2 the "Papilsky rule,"' 3 "Wells submissions,"' 4 the "passkey theory,"'" and "sunset
(1982);
American Bar Association Ad Hoc Committee on Developments in Investment
Services, Homogenization of FinancialInstitutions.- The Legislative and Regulatory
Response, 38 Bus. LAW. 241 (1982).
7. The book is hereinafter cited as REGULATION BY PROSECUTION.
8. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 18.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id at 20-3 1.
11. See id at 110. "CLOB" is an acronym for "consolidated limited order book," a
device which would automatically execute securities orders, and which would thus
function as part of an automated national market system. "Hard CLOB" refers to
the Peake-Mendelson-Williams "National Book System" proposal whereby all
bids and offers would be entered into a computer which would project those bids
and offers onto a screen located at each broker's desk. This system would allow a
broker to directly execute orders and make offers by pressing the keys on his
computer console. Proponents of the "hard-CLOB" scheme are sometimes called
"hard clobbers"; see also J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:
A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 520-23 (1982).
12. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 207. Karmel uses the term "disintermediation" to
describe the way money market funds permit small investors to pool their funds
for investment in large money market instruments. Prior to the development of
money market funds, only institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds could invest in such instruments. Since money market
funds permit an individual relatively direct access to these instruments, they have
reduced an individual investor's dependence on banks, insurers, or pension funds
as investment intermediaries.
13. Id. at 131-35. The "Papilsky Rule" emerged as a reaction to a judicial decision
defining the obligation of an investment adviser to a mutual fund to engage in
"underwriter recapture." Underwriter recapture is an arrangement by which the
mutual fund investment adviser would also act as a member of a selling group in
the distribution of securities, thereby obtaining a price concession from the underwriter, which could then be credited against the advisory fee charged to the mutual fund. In Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,627 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 1976), the court ruled that the savings realized through such a price concession should be passed on to the mutual fund
through a reduction in the advisory fee. In reaction to this case, the SEC adopted
a rule which, in effect, prohibited passing price concessions along to the institutional investor through "underwriter recapture." For a full discussion of these
ITIES DEALERS, INC., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY OF TOMORROW
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review."' 6 In addition, her book will receive more attention than it
deserves because her arguments fit nicely with the current conventional
wisdom.
Karmel's critique is not easy to summarize because her book is
rambling and repititious, 17 and she often seems more concerned with
vindication of the controversial role she played as a commissioner than
with careful, step-by-step articulation of a policy argument.' 8 She does
seem to be saying, however, that the SEC of the 1970's was the prisoner
of Stanley Sporkin's Enforcement Division. According to Karmel,
Sporkin and the members of his division were ideologues obsessed with
investor protection and corporate governance at the expense of the legitimate needs of business. Their chosen mode of regulation was fer-

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.

issues, see Brunelle, The Papilsky Rule and the Emerging Antitrust Dimensions of
the Securities Exchange Act, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 50 (1981).
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 222-26. In 1972, an SEC Advisory Committee on
Enforcement Policies and Practices, chaired by private attorney John A. Wells,
recommended that the Commission give parties against whom the SEC staff recommended proceedings an opportunity to present their own version of the facts to
the Commission. This procedure, subsequently adopted by the SEC to a limited
extent, gives the potential defendant an opportunity to state his case to the Commission before the Commission approves the initiation of administrative proceedings or a court action. These presentations have become known colloquially as
"Wells submissions." Id. at 223.
Id at 174. According to Karmel, the SEC justified its controversial disciplinary
program for securities lawyers on the theory that issuers and securities professionals "often depend on the advice . . . of a lawyer before securities can be sold
generally to the public. Investors therefore rely directly or indirectly on the work
and opinions of lawyers, who provide access to or who hold the passkey to the
marketplace." Id
Id. at 85-86, 255. Generally speaking, "sunset review" is the process whereby a
legislature will mandate review of existing administrative programs in order to
determine whether they should be continued. Id
For example, much of the discussion in Chapter Three, "Functional Weaknesses
in the Administrative Process," is substantially restated in Chapter Nine, "Law
Reform to Promote Capital Formation." In addition, Part One, "A Political
Analysis" could have been stripped of repeated protestations of Karmel's affection
for the SEC and of her identity as a "liberal." Furthermore, Karmel's stab at
writing a capsule history of the SEC would have been more successful without
detours into personal reminiscence, see, e.g., id at 73-74, or name calling. See,
e.g., id. at 66.
An author who begins a book with the words "I have been called a maverick" is a
person who takes herself very seriously indeed. 1d at 15. Another reviewer of
this book has suggested that the argumentative, conclusory tone of Karmel's book
suggests why she has been called a maverick:
[The book's] abrasive tone in discussing positions and individuals with
whom she disagreed and its conclusory rather than analytical approach
in dealing with complex issues gives insight into why Commissioner
Karmel earned the reputation of being a maverick dissenter rather than
an effective advocate capable of convincing her fellow commissioners to
accept her point of view.
Mann, Book Review, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 283, 283 (1982). For further discussion of
Karmel's stormy tenure on the Commission, see DepartingKarmel. Caution Will
Prevail, Legal Times of Wash., Jan. 28, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 30-31, 70, 147. Despite her disclaimers, Karmel's

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 12

vent prosecution of apparent violations, rather than careful rulemaking or reliance on the self-regulatory organizations. Because the
commissioners were largely former staff members, because loyalty to
the SEC as an institution clouded individual judgment, and because
actions brought by the Enforcement Division were typically resolved
by consent injunctions subject to the control of the Division, there was
no effective check on the SEC's abuse of its statutory mandate.2°
Karmel concludes that this exaggerated emphasis on investor protection and corporate governance (each to be achieved primarily through
prosecution of individual offenders) diverted the SEC from its other
major task, the encouragement of capital formation.21
Karmel expounds this general critique through case studies of the
SEC's role in the corporate governance movement, its approach to the
evolving national market system, its jurisdictional expansionism, and
its tendency to erode materiality as a prerequisite to mandatory disclosure. Although a full summary of each of these case studies is beyond the scope of this review, some of her specific criticisms deserve
attention.
For example, Karmel's analysis of how the SEC used its control
over the proxy rules to promote reforms in corporate governance, in
overseas selling practices, and, generally, in the corporate sense of social responsibility, points clearly to one unresolved contradiction in the
agency's conduct. Specifically, the SEC would bring or threaten to
bring enforcement actions against corporations which had paid foreign
officials to secure contracts from their governments on the ground that
such payments had not been adequately disclosed to the stockholders
in a proxy statement or annual report.22 The corporation would ordinarily agree to a consent injunction through which the SEC would
cause a restructuring of the board of directors or would apply other,
ever more novel, forms of ancillary relief.23 The SEC would bring all
of this about in the name of investor protection. The contradiction,
however, is that most shareholders of those companies were not concerned with the illegality or immorality of foreign payments. Rather,
those shareholders, like most shareholders, were primarily investors interested in tapping the corporation's income stream, thereby receiving a
return on their investment. Thus, the relatively small amounts paid by
management to receive lucrative foreign contracts were not matters of
information material to the shareholders and, Karmel concludes,
should not have been a basis for SEC action. In other words, the SEC's
sensitive payments program of the mid-1970's may have served some

20.
21.
22.
23.

analysis of the role of the Enforcement Division of the 1970's comes very close to
an ad hominem attack on Stanley Sporkin.
See generally id at 219-22.
Id at 145, 185.
See generally id at 148-59.
Id at 148, 220.
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public purpose, but it was not that of investor protection.24
Karmel generalizes this critique of the sensitive payments program
to encompass the SEC's entire effort to use the proxy rules to reform
corporate governance in order to institutionalize a sense of corporate
social responsibility.25 In Karmel's view, the SEC's goal was to restructure public corporations so that they would meet social needs as well as
economic goals. Karmel concedes that such reform may be desirable,
but insists that it cannot be achieved in the name of the investor, because the investor's objectives are, with rare exception, primarily economic.26 Karmel, therefore, concludes that the SEC's mandate of
investor protection provided no basis for the agency's attempt to reform
corporate governance. While one may argue about the implications of
all of this, it is hard to dispute her basic point about the limited nature
of the SEC's authority in this area.
Even more compelling is Karmel's indictment of the SEC's record
in the regulation of tender offers, a record recently marred by the
agency's assault on state tender offer laws.27 The SEC's attempt to
force preemption of state tender offer statutes would perhaps be more
defensible if it had been the result of a careful, thorough, and open
analysis of the regulatory alternatives, and not, as Karmel emphasizes,
ad hoc litigation.28 The SEC's behavior in this episode appears even
more
reprehensible once it is realized that the tender offer statute administered
by the SEC (the Williams Act) was not the product of careful study and policy formulation by the agency, but was an expedient
political compromise.29 The SEC's preemptive strike on state takeover
regulation thus seems more and more like institutional self-aggrandizement coupled with utter disregard for the effects of its actions on the
traditions of federalism.
Karmel suggests that the SEC's disregard for the broader consequences of its actions undermined the credibility of other agency efforts
in the 1970's. As an example, Karmel cites InternationalBrotherhoodof

Teamsters v. Daniel,3 0 where the Supreme Court rejected the SEC's assertion, as amicus curiae, that a noncontributory, compulsory pension

Id at 148-51.
Id at 140.
Id at 160-61, 186.
See generally id at 207-11. For a discussion of how the SEC attempted to preempt the state takeover laws first through litigation and then through a directly
preemptive rule, see Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation." State
Responses to MITE andKidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 692-702 (1981); Note, State
Regulation of Takeovers, 7 J. CORP. L. 603, 612-20 (1982).
28. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 211.
29. For a detailed examination of how the Williams Act represents one of the SEC's
failures to play a positive role in policy formulation, see J. SELIGMAN, THE
24.
25.
26.
27.

TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 432.

30. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
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plan constituted a "security."'" The SEC's action in Daniel was, according to Karmel, typical of the SEC's tendency to take adversarial
positions without fully analyzing the policy implications of its actions.3 2
An even more glaring example of the SEC's myopia was its argument in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrooka 3 that "there are no so-called territorial limitations" on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, since the Act
"is generally applicable whenever such application is necessary and appropriate for the protection of American investors and markets. '3 4 Although the Schoenbaum court rejected that argument, the SEC has
continued to urge that the securities laws be given the broadest possible
extraterritorial effect. 35 Karmel's criticism of this position is persuasive:
[T]he Commission looked at the [foreign] issuers from the
standpoint of a mythical public investor, entitled to the same
disclosure from foreign as from U.S. issuers. For better or
worse, the national interest is much more complex than this
single-minded focus. A regulatory policy that may have an
important impact on foreign policy, capital allocation and the
balance of payments should not be made by an independent
agency in the process of maintaining and expanding its jurisdiction through the prosecution of cases.36
While the SEC's record in the tender offer, pension plan, and foreign issuer contexts is marked by a disregard for the broader consequences of its prosecutorial actions, its record in two other areas is
marked by what Karmel would characterize as simple disregard for the
law. While this may be an overstatement, Karmel has accurately defined some of the unresolved tensions in the agency's rule 2(e) 37 professional responsibility program 3a and its use of section 21(a) 39 reports to
publicize cases that involved questionable conduct which did not seem
31. Id at 563-69.
32. See REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 191, where Karmel notes:
[T]he Commission refused to come out with a clear interpretation of the
type of employee-benefit plan that would be considered 'securities,' and
how the securities laws applied to different types of plans that were 'securities' until after the Daniel decision. Billions of dollars of pension
plan interests were affected by this interpretation. It should not have
been deferred for the sake of "winning" a single case.
Id (citations omitted).
33. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395
U.S. 906 (1969).
34. Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing at 11, 16, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), quotedin REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 217,
cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
35. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d
109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
36. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 219.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1982).
38. See generally REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 173-83.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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to constitute clear violations of the federal securities laws.4 °
Rule 2(e) permits the SEC to discipline any person practicing
before the agency who fails to meet certain generally specified standards of integrity and competence. In the early 1970's the SEC began
using the rule routinely in order to suspend or bar attorneys from practice before it. Since the SEC construes "practice before the Commission" to include the furnishing of any opinion or advice in connection
with a securities transaction, application of this rule could have a devastating effect. The rule 2(e) professional responsibility program drew
much of Karmel's fire while she was a Commissioner, and she restates
in her book two basic objections:
First, as a matter of statutory construction, I did not believe
the Commission had the authority to promulgate rule 2(e).
That is, I did not believe that the general power to make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
implement the provisions of the securities laws was a sufficient predicate for a program to discipline professionals, particularly attorneys. Second, I was convinced that the SEC's
utilization of [rlule 2(e) to promote the agency's regulatory
policies was an unwarranted interference with the right to the
effective assistance of counsel of persons regulated by the
Commission.4 I
While these objections are answerable,4 2 they do compel the conclusion
that the SEC should have been more tentative about developing disciplinary cases against the very same attorneys who were representing
persons under investigation or who were subject to prosecution by the
agency.
The SEC's expansive use of rule 2(e) is matched by its use of section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which authorizes the
agency to publish reports of its investigations. According to Karmel,
the SEC has frequently used the threat of section 21(a) publicity to
compel changes in corporate governance in cases which the agency
could not have established a violation of the securities laws and obtained an injunction.4 3 Karmel argues persuasively that the SEC's use
of publicity as an implied enforcement procedure is highly improper.
From these critiques Karmel derives some sensible recommendations. Her principal recommendation urges the SEC to shift from regulation by prosecution to a regulatory mode that emphasizes rulemaking, consensus building, and government business and interagency cooperation." Equally sensible is Karmel's insistence that the
40. See generally REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 196-98.
41. Id at 177.
42. See, for example, Karmel's summary of the SEC's responses to her arguments in
id at 179.
43. Id at 197-98.
44. Id at 95, 98, 109, 145, 185, 336. While the regulatory mode proposed by Karmel
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SEC abandon its institutional parochialism and defensiveness in order

to respond to the ongoing reorganization of the financial world.45 The

validity of some of Karmel's criticisms, and the value of some of her
recommendations, however, are undercut by some serious flaws in her

general approach.
First, her faith in the ability of the securities industry to regulate
itself seems largely unjustifiable. As Joel Seligman demonstrates in The
Transformation of Wall Street: .4Historyof the SecuritiesandExchange
Commission and Modern Corporate Finance," 6 the SEC's reliance on
the self-regulatory organizations has worked effectively only when the
SEC has demonstrated its willingness to use what William 0. Douglas,
the agency's third Chairman, might have called the "shotgun in the
closet."4 7 For example, Seligman shows in detail how the SEC's deferral to self-regulation by the New York Stock Exchange exacerbated the
"back-office" crisis of the late 1960's4" and prolonged the life of the
Exchange's outmoded and anti-competitive fixed commission rate
seems desirable in the abstract, and while the phrase "regulation by prosecution"
carries highly negative connotations, some doubts about the effectiveness of her
proposed mode should be expressed. Regulation through an agency's enforcement division has the virtue of precision, since the regulatory weight falls primarily on a narrow segment of the regulated industry. Regulation through broadlyfocused rule-making tends to effect all segments of the industry, thus generating
greater compliance costs as a whole, and increasing the total "amount" of regulation. Karmel does not seem to recognize this phenomenon, and emphasizes only
the negative aspects of the prosecutorial mode of regulation.
45. Id at 307.
46. The book is hereinafter cited as THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET.
47. The term "shotgun in the closet" is a paraphrase of how Douglas once described
the responsibility of the SEC to monitor the performance of the self-regulatory
organizations. "Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the
door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never
have to be used." W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940). This volume collects the addresses and public statements of Douglas as a member and
chairman of the SEC. One of the major achievements of THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET is its reexamination of Douglas' important role in the SEC's
early successes. THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 156-212. This reexamination is long overdue. Since Douglas' accomplishments as a Supreme Court
Justice overshadowed his accomplishments as an SEC commissioner, relatively
little scholarly attention has been paid to that part of his career. The most detailed study prior to Seligman's book was Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas.- His Influence on Corporateand SecuritiesRegulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964). Douglas
himself has also described his experiences at the agency in his memoirs. W.
DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 257-315 (1974).
48. The "back-office" crisis of 1967-70 was the result of an inability of many brokerage firms, both large and small, to handle the increased flow of business generated
by a sharp and prolonged increase in trading volume on the New York Stock
Exchange. The inability of the industry's self-regulatory organization to cope
with this crisis helped set in motion the greatest rash of brokerage firm collapses in
Wall Street's history. See generally THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
450. Seligman argues convincingly that the SEC deferred to the Exchange's regulation of its member firms for too long a time, and that it must therefore bear
some of the blame for the wave of firm failures in 1969-70. Id at 464.
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structure.4 9 Similarly, Seligman shows how the SEC contributed to the
near breakdown of the American Stock Exchange during the early
1960's by assuming that the Exchange was aware of its responsibilities
and was capable of meeting them.5" The agency's failure to pull the
shotgun out of the closet during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations also allowed the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), which regulates over-the-counter broker-dealers, to relax its
disciplinary standards. This lack of disciplinary rigor on the part of the
SEC and NASD was, according to Seligman, at least partially responsible for the discernible increase in securities fraud during the 1950's. 5 1
An objective appraisal of this record should be enough to cast doubt on
Karmel's assertion that advances in commercial technology render the
current marketplace more capable of self-policing than was formerly
the case.52
Karmel's rosy view of the securities industry has also colored her
perception of the ongoing battle over the national market system.53
Not only does she describe the SEC's behavior in the process of developing this system as overly strident and even vituperative, but she also
accuses the SEC of attempting "to indict the entire securities industry
for failing to accomodate itself. . . to a rapidly changing economy and
marketplace."5 4 While Karmel's description is not without merit, it appears insubstantial when compared to Seligman's incisive analysis concerning the SEC's efforts to avoid disruptions in securities trading while
developing a central market system. 55 Seligman's analysis, in fact, leads
him to the opposite conclusion. Seligman argues that the various sectors of the securities industry are responsible for the delay in the development of a technologically efficient system which would maximize
competition among market-makers, and suggests that the SEC has
been unduly concerned with preserving existing institutions and jobs at
the expense of long-term economic rationality. 6
Second, Karmel's insistence that the SEC has neglected its responsibility to assist capital formation is misconceived. The nature of her
misconception is demonstrated most vividly by her sole positive recommendation with respect to how the SEC could play a greater role in
capital formation. Karmel recommends that Congress insert language
into the preambles of the securities statutes requiring the SEC, when
implementing those statutes, to encourage capital formation.5 7 Why is
49. See generally id at 382-416.
50. Id at 281-89.
51. Id at 299-300.
52. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 339.
53. See generally id at 486-534.
54. Id at 109.
55. See generally THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 486-534.
56. Id at 533-34.
57. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 300-01. A current SEC commissioner, Bevis
Longstreth, has also recognized that the existing federal securities statutes do not
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Karmel's only positive recommendation so tentative, so aspirational, so
devoid of substantive content? Why did she have so much trouble producing a more substantial redefinition of the SEC's role in the capital
formation process? The answer is simple: the SEC's role in that process
can only be very limited.
The SEC can encourage capital formation by meeting its traditional responsibility of sustaining investor confidence through investor
protection. As Seligman shows at length, and as Karmel would probably concede, the agency has generally met that responsibility. The SEC
can also encourage capital formation by removing or reducing the costs
of regulatory compliance when those costs are disproportionate to the
social and economic benefits generated by compliance. Accordingly,
the agency has been gradually redesigning its scheme of transactional
exemptions in order to allow small businesses to raise capital without
incurring the costs of full-scale registration of securities.5 8 Since the
costs of full-scale registration are prohibitively high for small businesses, these reforms may remove some obstacles to small business capital formation.
Simply stated, there is not much the SEC can do to foster capital
formation beyond meeting its traditional goals of maintaining the stability of capital markets, sustaining investor confidence, and removing
unnecessary impediments to capital formation. Our nation's current
difficulty in generating capital has much more to do with the decline in
American productivity than with what the SEC has or has not done.
The causes of this decline undoubtedly include the obsolescence of our
industrial plants, the dwindling of our internal energy resources, the
strength of our foreign competitors, and the short-sightedness of both
our managerial and labor policies.59 The SEC and the securities laws,
therefore, cannot bear much of the responsibility for creating our namandate promotion of capital formation by the SEC, but suggests that amendment along the lines suggested by Karmel would be inappropriate:
Congress did [not] tell us to facilitate capital formation. It told us to
protect investors. Congress knew that by doing that, and by assuring fair
and orderly markets, the SEC would indirectly be assuring that the marketplace would be an excellent way to form capital and transfer capital.
You facilitate capital formation directly through tax policy, fiscal and
monetary policy, not through what we are doing-except indirectly.
Special Report.- Concern Over CongressionalReactions Affects SEC Actions, 15
SEC. & L. REP. (BNA) 566, 571-72 (1983).
58. For a useful summary of those developments, see Parnell, Kohl & Huff, Private
and Limited Offerings After A Decade of Experimentation.- The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M. L. REV. 633 (1982).
59. The flight of investment capital from equity to debt also had a negative impact on
capital formation, but this phenomenon has much more to do with the
macroeconomic causes of high interest rates than with the federal scheme of securities regulation. For general considerations of the current economic quandry,
see Thurow, How to Rescue a Drowning Economy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 1,
1982, at 2; Rohatyn, ReconstructingAmerica, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 5, 1981, at
16; Galbraith, The Conservative Onslaught, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 22, 1981, at 30.
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tional problems with respect to capital formation, nor can they do
much to solve them. Karmel's argument that the SEC should direct its
energies toward capital formation thus involves not only a misconception of the agency's role but also an exaggeration of its importance.
Third, Karmel's assertion that the SEC's sensitive payments program constituted a distortion of the agency's mandate to promote full
and fair disclosure suffers from a failure to appreciate the real benefits
of mandatory disclosure. Karmel argues that the SEC's sensitive payments program could not be justified as a means of promoting full and
fair disclosure because such payments were not matters of material information which would be important to the ordinary investor.6" Since
the ordinary investor would not be interested in disclosure of such payments, Karmel concludes that the issuers in question should not have
been punished for failure to disclose them. This argument, however,
fallaciously presumes that the SEC-mandated disclosure is valuable because it gives the potential investor the material information needed for
an educated investment decision. As Homer Kripke and other critics
have pointed out, 6 ' this presumption is false because: (1) the ordinary
investor is often unable to understand the information he is given;
(2) the information provided about one issuer does not necessarily permit a meaningful comparison of that investment opportunity with
others; (3) investment decisions are often made on the basis of other
factors which have little if anything to do with the information an issuer is required to disclose; and (4) information is often not delivered
until after the transaction is completed. 62 In short, SEC-mandated disclosure cannot be defended as a technique of creating a class of informed investors. Karmel's attack on the sensitive payments program is
thus flawed because it defines the policy of full and fair disclosure
solely as a response to the needs of the mythical informed investor.
Karmel fails to recognize the real public concerns served by this disclosure system, and accordingly fails to see how the agency's sensitive payments program may in fact be justifiable in terms of the policy of full
disclosure.
The SEC's policy of full disclosure has at least three beneficial effects. First, mandatory disclosure forces corporate managers to tell the
truth. As corporate managers become accustomed to telling the truth,
they may begin to see that full and fair disclosure is not only a way to
60. REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 148-51; see supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
61. See, e.g., J. BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS: WHEN PRICES WENT TOPLESS 347
(1973); H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 24-36 (1979); H. MANNE & E. SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN
TRANSITION 51 (1974). For evaluations of these critiques see Ratner, The SEC.Portraitof the Agency As A Thirty-Seven Year Old, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 583
(1971); New Approaches To Disclosure In Registered Security Offerings-A Panel
Discussion, 28 Bus. LAW. 505 (1973).
62. Ratner, The SEC. Portraitof the Agency as a Thirty-Seven Year Old, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 583, 586-87 (1971).
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avoid liability, but also a way to help the issuer's business by broadening the market for its securities.6 3 Second, mandatory disclosure has
improved corporate managers' performance with respect to the institutions they serve. As David Ratner points out:
There are many questionable arrangements which corporate
managers [would] set up if they [could] do so in secret, but
which they [would] not set up if [those arrangements] [had] to
be disclosed on a public record. The motivation [against such
arrangements] may be fear of lawsuits, or simply embarrassment, but, regardless of the exact cause, I would guess that the
SEC's disclosure requirements have deterred more questionable deals than all the substantive rules laid down in state corporation laws or court decisions. 6'
Third, mandatory disclosure generates the type of information which
the marketplace needs to operate efficiently. The premise of the semistrong version of the efficient market hypothesis is that all publicly
available information about securities is processed efficiently by the
market and is fully reflected in the prices of the securities.65 The corollary of this hypothesis is that securities prices will be "fair" only if the
market has accurate and complete information upon which to act. Accordingly, the SEC's disclosure systems (especially the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act's periodic disclosure system) are important to the fairness of the securities markets.
When the public concerns served by mandatory disclosure are defined in these terms, it may be possible to justify the SEC's sensitive
payments program. The doctored books and phony reports used to
hide payments to foreign officials may have been of little interest to the
ordinary investor, as Karmel suggests, but they represent a gross departure from the tradition of managerial honesty which SEC-mandated
disclosure has attempted to foster. While the agency may have overreacted by devoting an excessive amount of time and money to this
program, it could not have countenanced such a departure without undermining its long-term efforts to promote managerial responsibility
and the fair operation of the market.
Finally, Karmel's criticism of the SEC's performance in the 1970's,
while accurate at points, suffers from a lack of historical perspective.
63. Id. at 587-88. Ratner admits that this may be wishful thinking, but it is possible
that the institutionalization of reporting procedures may eventually make managerial truth-telling normative.
64. Id. at 588.
65. For a concise explanation of the efficient market hypothesis in its weak, semistrong and strong forms, see Walker & Hadaway, Merit StandardsRevisited An
EmpiricalAnalysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651,
656-57 (1982) and the authorities cited therein; see also H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 309-11 (1979);
J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70110 (1973); THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 563-68.
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For example, when the SEC's corporate governance initiatives are regarded in historical perspective, they seem less questionable. The
evolution of American corporate law has been marked by the gradual
but inexorable removal of restraints on the ability of corporate management to disregard the interests of not only public shareholders but
also the public at large.66 Although the SEC's corporate governance
initiatives may have exceeded or misconstrued the agency's specific
statutory mandate, they were the first real attempt to redefine the role
of the public corporation in American life. It may not have been entirely appropriate for the SEC to undertake that redefinition, but it was
perhaps necessary for someone to do it.
The historical perspective which Karmel's book lacks is provided
brilliantly by Joel Seligman's The Transformation of Wall Street. His
book reminds us of two facts which are so basic that they tend to be
forgotten. First, American finance has been fundamentally transformed in the last fifty years. Gone are the days in which the financial
markets were dominated by an exchange once described as a "private
No longer are the markets
club" possessing "elements of a casino.
69
68
abused by the7 ° use of "bear raids," "preferred" stockholder lists,
"pyramiding" and the many other manipulative and dishonest practices for which there were no adequate legal remedies. Today's
66. The literature on corporate governance is voluminous, so only a few of the most
important works can be cited here. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev'd ed. 1968); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
(1971); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION

67.
68.

69.
70.

(1976); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); Cary, Federalismand Corporate
Law.- Reections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Coffee, Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry. Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Douglas, Directors Who Do
Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1934).
This was Douglas' description of the New York Stock Exchange. SEC Press Release, Nov. 23, 1937, reprintedin W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 65, 70
(1940), quoted in THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 73.
"Bear raids" were conspiracies to depress the market so that the raiders could
profit from short-selling. See generally THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
-16. Seligman offers this particularly lucid explanation of "short-selling":
Usually an investor purchases stock and later sells it, earning a profit if
the sales price of the security exceeds the purchase price. A short sale
reverses the chronology. The investor who believes the market price of a
security will decline sells the stock first, borrows shares from a broker to
deliver to the purchaser, and profits if the price of the share does, in fact,
decline, by purchasing shares at a lower price to return to the lending
broker.
Id at 9.
"Preferred" stockholder lists were lists of insiders who management would allow
to purchase securities at secret, discount prices before the securities would be offered to the public. See THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET X.
Stock "pyramiding" was a device by which private banks like J.P. Morgan and
Company or individuals like Samuel Insull could control public utility holding
company empires despite having only minority common stock ownership. The
key to the device was the purchase of voting control in a holding company placed
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financial markets are subject to abuse, but they surely cannot be
painted in such lurid hues. Second, this transformation of American
finance has been achieved principally through the SEC's administration of the federal securities statutes. Seligman's book is thus aptly
subtitled A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Modern CorporateFinance.
Seligman develops these themes in great detail through clear exposition of the legal and financial technicalities, and through meticulous
attention to the primary source materials. His tone throughout is scholarly and objective. This is not to say, however, that Seligman lacks a
point of view, because, in fact, he has a pronounced one. He never
explicitly states his point of view, but it would seem to include a belief
in certain inherently anti-social tendencies of modem corporate enterprise, a corollary skepticism about the effectiveness of industry self-regulation, and a disdain for the free market enthusiasts. It also includes a
faith in the efficacy of the administrative process, a conception of the
large corporation as a quasi-public entity with clear social responsibilities, and a basic belief in the ability of men to consciously reshape
economic institutions in order to achieve the public good. In short, Seligman brought to bear on this work the ideas and attitudes expressed
most directly in his earlier book, Taming the Giant Corporation,7 1 which
was co-authored by Ralph Nader and Mark Green, two leaders of the
corporate governance movement. Despite the presence of such a strong
point of view, however, Seligman allows his argument to be made
through the accumulation of evidence and the careful assessment of
different opinions rather than through conclusory theorizing, ill-tempered polemics, or ad hominem attacks. It can thus be said that this
first complete history of the last fifty years of American finance and its
regulation will set the standard for many years to come.72 Any attempt
at the top of a pyramid of holding companies. See THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET 128.
71. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
72. While THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET is the first complete history of
the SEC, there is literature on specific portions of the SEC's history. For example,
the early years of the agency were the subject of R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S
SEC (1964); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970).
Useful discussions of the same era can also be found in M. PARRISH, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 234-37 (1982); D. RITCHIE

& J. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 43-78 (1980); and Jennings, Mr. Justice
Douglas.- His Influence on Corporateand Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920,
934-51 (1964). Relatively little attention has been paid to the SEC of the 1940's
and 1950's. Of some value is a collection of articles included in a Symposium on
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1959); see

also SEC, A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1934-1959 (1961). The SEC of the 1960's and
1970's has received more attention, although mostly in the form of memoirs and
journalistic accounts of particular events. See, e.g., J. BROOKS: THE Go-Go
YEARS: WHEN PRICES WENT TOPLESS (1973); W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967) (memoirs of a former SEC chairman); K. PATRICK,
PERPETUAL JEOPARDY: THE TEXAS GULF SULPHUR AFFAIR (1972). The sparse-

19831

Book Reviews

385

to write a history which is more critical of the SEC and its effects on
American finance will have to contend with this formidable book.
While The Transformation of Wall Street is mostly the history of
the SEC's success, it is, in some respects, also the history of its failures.
Seligman suggests that these failures have resulted from certain structural weaknesses in the agency's organization and in its statutory mandate. For example, the SEC's status as an independent agency (a kind
of stepchild of both the Executive and the Congress) has, at times, left
it without the kind of political clout needed to achieve its goals.7 3 In
addition, the breadth of the agency's statutory mandate has occasionally left it unable to deal effectively with dramatic developments, such
as the "back office" crisis and conglomerate craze of the late 1960's,
because the agency's limited resources were absorbed elsewhere. Similarly, the range of the SEC's responsibilities and the limitations of its
resources exacerbate a tendency to solve problems through ad hoc
litigation rather than through precise economic analysis and careful
rule-making. Finally, the old-fashioned compartmentalization of the
financial world implicit in the SEC's enabling statutes may hinder its
ability to deal effectively with the current reorganization of financial
institutions. Thus, Seligman's historical analysis also reveals a current
need for reform of the agency and the laws it administers.
It perhaps makes little sense to compare a book as scholarly and
ambitious as Seligman's with a book as personal as Karmel's. The
writers had different goals, and their works will be put to different uses.
By way of comparison, then, let it suffice to say that The Transformation
of Wall Street offers, among its other riches, a clear and convincing
corrective to much that is disturbing in Regulation by Prosecution.

ness of this list suggests that there was a real need for THE

TRANSFORMATION OF

WALL STREET.

73. The vulnerability of an independent agency like the SEC is one of Seligman's
major themes. Indeed, he begins his book with the following quote from former
SEC Chairman William Cary: "Without the cooperation of both Congress and
the Executive, little constructive can be achieved. To reemphasize the point, an
agency is literally helpless if either branch is uninterested or unwilling to lend
support." THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET vi.

